

Balog Dóra: International regulations in action: The DPRK's nuclear program and its challenges to the field of international law and international relations – Part I

Abstract

The following paper, in two continuous formats, discusses the nuclear activity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the challenges it poses to international peace and security from an international law and international relations point of reference.

The first part is concerned with the international law perspective of the paper. After an introductory passage, the theoretical background of nuclear development is introduced, including concepts such as nuclear threat, nuclear states and non-nuclear states, the security dilemma, nuclear taboo. Furthermore, the reasons behind the urge of the DPRK to develop its very own nuclear arsenal, constantly improving that despite international condemnation, are explored. The second part elaborates on the consequences that nuclearization of the DPRK and its non-compliance with agreements have regarding international relations and the way diplomatic relations took shape as a result of recurring sanctions from the international community and the DPRK's repetitive violations of agreements and treaties. The chapter encompasses the events concerning the relationship between the DPRK and the parties on the international level, i.e. the United States, and due to its geographical location, on the regional level with the Republic of Korea, Japan, People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Conclusively, this part aims to suggest that despite threatening attitude, efforts are still made to normalize deteriorated diplomatic relations.

“None of us want to live in a world of permanent instability, where nuclear weapons have become the currency of international relations. Alternative solutions are within our reach.”

- Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations¹

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the nuclear age, as Siracusa puts it, “there were no rules, no non-proliferation norms, no concept of nuclear deterrence, and particularly, no taboo against nuclear war.”² In relation to this, the public concept about nuclear weapons was mainly characterized by uncertainty, common anxiety and uneasiness. On the one hand, the only obvious fact was the presence of the nuclear arms race and the devastating capabilities of nuclear weapons that have already declared several millions of lives. On the other hand, the advancements made in the field of nuclear energy held the promise of important peaceful uses, such as the possibility of limitless energy to the globe provided by nuclear power.

With the spread of information about the capabilities of nuclear power, the demand for sharing the details has also emerged. However, the United States of America, the main holder of the most significant nuclear secrets, was not eager to share any of its knowledge due to the lack of an effective international control system. In the early phase in countering nuclear threat, international agreements and tied non-proliferation were created as a form of controlling the presence and spread of nuclear weapons. The bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki shed light onto the darkness and danger that the atomic bomb meant for the world. Right after the incidents in Japan, the world feared that similar situations might happen, and the U.S. government also realized that it would be almost impossible to maintain an American monopoly on atomic bombs, so the only hope that civilization can hold onto would be the renunciation and the elimination of nuclear weapons that can be realized through international agreements.

States with emerging desires to become nuclear powers account for the majority of concerns that the international community has. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of these states that has been undermining international attempts towards

¹ *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Faces Crisis of Compliance, Confidence, says Kofi Annan in address to University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 18 May 2006.*

² Siracusa, 2008, 27.

denuclearization and nuclear disarmament through noncompliance and covert development of its nuclear capacity.

The field of nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament has gradually broadened as the potential to exploit and misuse nuclear energy increased and the need for action has emerged. The basis of discussion in this thesis will be the intention to discover the nuclear aspect of interactions between the DPRK and the international community, while scrutinizing the historical context of nuclear development in the DPRK and taking into account efforts of the United Nations (UN) or neighboring countries against the nuclear threat.

The paper is divided into four greater sections and each of the aims to discuss the main questions posed in this paper. The first section provides the background of nuclear energy development and how the DPRK has managed to improve its nuclear arsenal to the point where it can threaten to use it against other states and the possible motives behind this strategy will be addressed as well. The second and third sections are dedicated to the aspects of international relations between the DPRK and the international community, more specifically the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, China and Russia and a review on how the relations between these countries were affected by the DPRK's nuclear activities in the diplomatic realm. One part of the fourth section is dedicated to the aspects of international law, describing how the field reacted to the gradual appearance of nuclear weapons as a threat to global peace and security, how the fight against this global danger has been attended to via establishing international institutions and signing treaties and multilateral agreements and how these affected the DPRK's nuclear development. The notion of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) will be elaborated on within this section and the idea of a regional NWFZ involving the DPRK will be discussed as a potential solution for denuclearizing the state. The second half constitutes that core part of the thesis as it describes and discusses the sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK starting in 2006 and their effectiveness in handling the problem. Sanctions regimes have been established in order to ensure that states violating international agreements give up their condemned behavior and change their attitude and it will be outlined whether the sanctions became stricter after each violation of the resolutions and how successful these economic and financial measures appeared to be.

In my point of view, the suitable research design to conduct is the method of documentary research, since facts, theories and possible conclusions can be drawn from already gathered information and the availability of written academic sources is high. Since the research will specifically consider international law as a basic frame of reference for the

issue, the usage of international agreements, declarations and nonproliferation acts and go through the institutions established for controlling the possession of nuclear weapons since these are also important features to consider. International sources to observe include the statutes of institutions and the transcripts of treaties and agreements, as well as the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the UNSC. Regarding a better understanding of the nuclear phenomenon, the security dilemma and the strategy of the DPRK relevant books and articles on the issue will be included and considered.

From my perspective, the reasons behind the DPRK's actions and strategy are fascinating, concerning and distressing at the same time which serves as the basic interest for carrying out research on this topic. Furthermore, observing the international community's reaction and following how the field of international law has been and continues to be shaped through the sanctions, agreements and other attempts to tame the threatening DPRK is like seeing how history is being made since every step taken in the progress is a potential milestone for the future.

2. Background

The basis for the DPRK's nuclear arsenal originates from the creation of nuclear weapons, hence it is inevitable to discuss and cover the background of nuclear weapons as well. The basic difference between nuclear and conventional weapons is that the scale of a nuclear explosion "can be many thousands (or millions) of times more powerful than the largest conventional explosion."³ Both explosions rely on the destructivity of the blast, although, the temperatures within a nuclear explosion are significantly higher than in a conventional explosion. Moreover, the so-called thermal energy is released during a nuclear explosion in the form of light and heat and [t]his energy is capable of causing severe skin burns and of starting fires at considerable distances."⁴

Siracusa offers views on the nuclear threat remaining essential with regard to the relations between states and threatening to become more important. According to him, the spread of these weapons would most likely bring about "two potentially calamitous effects: (1) terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weapons, (2) the proliferation of threats to use them, greatly complicating global security and in many respects harder to undo [more states join the nuclear club to enhance their prestige or overcome perceived insecurity]."⁵ The table below presents the *de facto* and *de jure* nuclear weapon states in the world. At the beginning

³ Siracusa, 2008, 5.

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Siracusa, 2008, preface.

of the era of nuclear development the number of nuclear weapons and inventories increased dramatically and besides the most powerful states during the Cold War, other states began their own development and stockpiling of nuclear inventories. Besides constant improvement and stockpiling, the reduction of nuclear weapons also began due to international pressure growing against nuclearization.




Table 1. Nuclear-weapon states⁶

As Goodby puts it, there have been significant changes and constants in the nuclear arena during the past seventy years. On the one hand, the modifications include the appearance and disappearance of different technologies of nuclear weapons; the change in the main objective of the coercive diplomacy to the principle of deterrence only; and the fact the technology of the components “has now leveled off” and that the weapons used in deterrence are only “lower-yield weapons”⁷. On the other hand, the constants rather concern the political-psychological field of the situation. One is the progress that has been made with regard to “ending reliance on nuclear weapons for defense purposes [which relied on factors such as] national leadership attitudes and the state of the relationships between nuclear-armed

⁶ N. Rózsa and Péczeli, 2013, 79.

⁷ Goodby, 2015.

nations.” Furthermore, public confidence has evolved endowing nuclear weapons with the ability “to preserve peace and to protect the safety of the homeland.”⁸

Right after the end of World War II, the United States was the only state with nuclear capacity due to the absence of knowledge and raw materials on the Soviet side. Nonetheless, the USSR has managed to obtain enough information – with the contribution of a network of spies- to create its own fission-style bomb and to discover regional sources of uranium in Eastern Europe. These actions have led to the test of the very first Soviet nuclear bomb in 1949.⁹ During the following decades, the Cold War superpowers launched a deadly race up on the nuclear ladder in the 1950s which lasted until the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. This era was characterized by superpowers and other states, such as the United Kingdom, France and China developing and stockpiling more and more nuclear warheads. Nevertheless, the peaceful end of the Cold War did not mean the end of nuclear threats to global security.

First and foremost, it is decisive to take into account historical events that contributed to the DPRK becoming a state in the 21st century with an obsession of continuously developing its nuclear arsenal and to shape a national attitude that poses a recurring threat and growing concern to international peace and stability. When trying to comprehend the history of the DPRK, at least two types of histories are available: the one that is made up of the information chunks coming from different documentations, “semi-ridiculous statistics and economic figures, the comments of the country’s leaders and diplomats [...] and the testimonies of “¹⁰ refugees and the prescribed and adjusted observations of visitors. Besides that, there is the official history that is released by the leadership of the country in order to present their own kind of history with their own perception of past events. The state has gradually and systematically isolated itself from the outside world and given up its responsibilities as a member of the international community (e.g. not being part of international or regional forums, the World Bank and the IMF). During the leadership of Kim Il-sung, the country had the support of the Soviet bloc, with Stalin financially aiding the country and the government policies of Kim Il-sung (which sometimes turned out to be rather disadvantageous for the people), however the North Koreans had been constantly encouraged

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ *Atomic Bomb History* (History.com) <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/atomic-bomb-history> (Accessed: 27 April 2020)

¹⁰ French, 2014, xvii.

by state propaganda and had the responsibility to participate in the “arduous march”, nonetheless it was all part of the state ideology that has been imposed on people.¹¹

After the collapse of the communist regime and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the DPRK has remained “the only unreformed Stalinist-style command economy [which] still publicly and vocally adheres to a Military First ideology of ‘putting the army before the working class’”¹². However, by today the tables have turned¹³ and now the DPRK is facing economic stagnation while holding up “a rigid political system that is maintained despite famine and economic collapse”.¹⁴ Many leaders within the international community firmly believed that the DPRK would simply collapse inward because it would no longer be able to operate and manage the current political system without constant, mainly, financial assistance from outside allies. Although these implications failed to meet reality, because the DPRK managed to maintain the regime even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the death of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung in 1994 and, later on, the death of his successor Kim Jong-il in 2011.

Scrutinizing the theoretical background behind the aspects of the DPRK’s domestic and foreign policy concerning the attitude towards nuclear development and towards the proclaimed status believed to accompany the possession of nuclear technology is intertwined with the underlying notion of security dilemma and contributes greatly to understanding the possible reason behind the acts of the DPRK.

The concept of “security dilemma” is identified to reflect the logic of offensive realism. The basic notion of the concept is that the increase in the security of one state, causes the security of others to decrease. That makes it challenging for a state to strengthen its chances for survival while avoiding threatening the attempts of survival of other states. The concept was first introduced in 1950 by John Herz who, after analyzing the anarchic nature of the international system, implied that the security dilemma emerged because of a situation when “[states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others [, which] in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.”¹⁵ Furthermore, in this situation no state can ever feel totally secure,

¹¹ Kim Il-sung created his own state ideology by fusing Soviet socialism with indigenous Korean traditions, thus the socialist attitude merged with the significance of history and customs. The success of establishing the kind of ideology lay behind the strong domestic need to rid the Korean society away from Japanese colonization and oppression.

¹² French, 2014, 2.

¹³ Compared to the decades of 1960 and 1970 when the newly formed DPRK presented a more effective economic development and higher growth as opposed to its Southern counterpart.

¹⁴ French, 2014, 4.

¹⁵ Mearsheimer, 2001, 43.

power competition continues to accumulate, and the states enter a never-ending circle of security and power inequality. Within the international system, all states follow or aim to follow the same logic, i.e. to look for opportunities when they can take advantage of one another and their try to prevent other states from taking advantage of them. All in all, states pay attention to both offense and defense, or as Mearsheimer confirms “[t]hey think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense [which] leads to a world of constant security competition.”¹⁶

Nevertheless, there are other concerning factors that keep the great powers and members of the global community on alert, which are the “[f]ears that weak and failing states may incubate transnational terrorism [and] that poorly governed countries may be unable or disinclined to control stocks of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or prevent the onward spread or leakage of WMD-related technology.”¹⁷ This situation is made more complicated since 13 countries, out of the 17 possessing WMD programs, are considered to be “countries at risk of instability.”¹⁸ Today, one of the most frightening prospects is that a nuclear-armed state like Pakistan or the DPRK might lose control of its nuclear weapons through collapse or theft, risking that the weapons might get into the hands of actors without proper knowledge about the dangers and without a suitable level of responsibility towards global security.

According to Kenneth Waltz, nuclear weapons played a significant role in maintaining peace in the world after the world wars that have shaken the globe to its core. Their presence “make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons.”¹⁹ However, it is their presence that causes the so-called security dilemma. On the one hand, their development has contributed to maintaining peace between the great powers and prevented them from going into military adventures. On the other hand, their continuing spread among states has been causing widespread fear and uncertainty towards the future. Waltz also discusses some effects of the weapons on their possessors. He proclaims that “states coexist in a condition of anarchy”²⁰ and they apply the principle of self-help by which states must assist themselves by providing for their own security. That is why when the state of peace is discussed, the use of force, applied strategies and employed weapons need to be taken into consideration.

¹⁶ Mearsheimer, 2001, 43.

¹⁷ Howard and Forest, 2008, 50.

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ Waltz, 1981.

²⁰ Waltz, 1981.

Before the creation and development of nuclear weapons, these were addressed as any other weapons in the history of weapons and warfare, i.e. when a new kind of armament is introduced, it ultimately becomes widely acknowledged as legitimate. Nevertheless, with nuclear weaponry, it happened the other way around and they have turned out to be recognized “as abhorrent and unacceptable weapons of mass destruction, with a taboo on their use.”²¹

In theory, nuclear taboo as a notion is extremely important because it poses a challenge to international norms which is believed to be created solely from the side and for the advantage of powerful nations. In a practical sense it is significant as it sheds light on restraints on the use of nuclear weapons.²² By definition, nuclear taboo is identified as “a de facto prohibition against the first use of nuclear weapons [and it rather considers] normative belief about the behavior. [Moreover, it] is a particularly forceful kind of normative prohibition that is concerned with [...] behavior that is defined” to pose a threat to individuals and communities within a society.²³ A taboo consists of two basic elements that need to be considered: its objective and phenomenological aspects.

The effectiveness of the concept is enhanced and supplemented by international law and agreements that by definition consider the freedom of action regarding nuclear weapons with great restrictions. Nonetheless, nuclear taboo is still only a de facto norm, without any legal mandatory nature.

2.1. Development of DPRK’s nuclear technology

The story of the DPRK’s interests in developing nuclear weapons is long-standing and goes back to the 1950s, after the end of the Korean War and the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In 1955, a delegation was invited to Moscow for a conference on nuclear energy and that event marked the beginning of the DPRK’s involvement in nuclear development. According to Ford, 1956 was a year when the DPRK signed an agreement with Moscow to involve North Korean scientists in a training on nuclear energy at the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute.²⁴ Following the establishment of the Yongbyon-based Nuclear Scientific Research Centre in the 1960s, the Soviet Union’s assistance continued, apart from financial contribution, in the form of actual training by Soviet scientists. In 1965, the DPRK received a nuclear facility from the Soviet Union in

²¹ Tannenwald, 2005, 5.

²² Tannenwald, 2005, 5.

²³ Optcit, 8.

²⁴ Ford, 2018.

which highly enriched uranium was burned and where North Korean scientists had the opportunity to do scientific research on nuclear development.

During the 1980s, the Soviet Union was the first in line to supply the DPRK with nuclear technology and with their help, the state could construct a five-megawatt Magnox reactor in Yongbyon.²⁵ The DPRK took the improvement to a new level and by 1986 the reactor “was capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium”²⁶ as well as, it “also had the enormous advantage of fuel cycle [...] using indigenously mined natural uranium.”²⁷ This time of the decade also brought about attempts to decrease foreign assistance for the DPRK’s development and it resulted in the DPRK becoming independent of foreign resources and capable of completing research and conducting tests by itself by the middle of the 1980s.²⁸ Due to central pressure, the DPRK decided to sign the *Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons* (NPT) in 1992 and permitted four rounds of inspections from the *International Atomic Energy Agency* (IAEA), however, it turned out to be a rather short cooperation as the IAEA detected anomalies during the on-site inspections and the DPRK failed to account for the ambiguity.

The presence of the military being at the core of the society in the DPRK has been around since the Korean War. Even though the scope of the military in the DPRK is hardly a match for countries, such as the United States, it “would [still] be a serious obstacle to any invasion from the South.”²⁹ When observing the state’s missile program, the DPRK had gradually developed “the capacity to launch intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting mainland South Korea and much of Japan,”³⁰ however, further stages of development were yet to be achieved. After 2017, succeeding a series of improvements regarding its nuclear missile technology, the DPRK has successfully tested intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).³¹

Back in 2011, it first seemed that Kim Jong-un as the new leader with a wider education and more open-minded thinking would want to distance himself from his father and grandfather and would stand up as a more modern leader, however, everything has gone

²⁵ Ford, 2018, 11.

²⁶ Optcit, 187.

²⁷ Ford, 2018, 187.

²⁸ This entailed that the state was no longer exposed to other countries’ support or potential refusal of providing help, i.e. the PRC had previously refused to give its nuclear technology to the DPRK (in 1964 and in the 1970s).

²⁹ Ford, 2018, 182.

³⁰ *ibid*

³¹ By 2018, the progress has reached the stage where hitting the island of Guam and, potentially, anywhere within the mainland territory of the United States emerged among the possibilities of a DPRK strike. (Ford, 2018, 182)

against the assumptions. As author Kim writes, since Kim Jong-un stepping into office, the DPRK “has ratcheted up tensions by conducting missile and nuclear tests and threatening to launch what it has called a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea.”³² Since the end of 2012, the DPRK has shown intentions regarding a possible military confrontation by launching long-range rockets and repeatedly conducting nuclear tests. These actions have increased the opposition of the global community and resulted in the imposition of several sanctions on the DPRK and the growing distance between the Hermit Kingdom and the rest of the world.

When discussing the armed forces of the DPRK, nuclear weapons must be covered with probably, an even greater concern than in any other country’s case. Already in the 1980s the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program was operating on a high capacity and at that time it has been predicted that the country had successfully produced plutonium that is enough for the development of at least one atomic bomb by the year 1992. Obviously, concerns and questions have been raised by the global community and member states of the United Nations made several attempts to put a halt to the nuclear development in the DPRK, with more or less success. When the current leader, Kim Jong-un rose to power with intensified ambitions, a new era began regarding nuclear armistice and ballistic missile technology. There have been a series of nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, however, their test in July 2017 including an intercontinental ballistic missile (with an estimated range of 8,000 km) has eventually drawn the full attention of the global community and shed lights on the possible nuclear capacities of the DPRK.

There is no doubt that the DPRK has made several significant attempts towards bringing about an indigenous nuclear problem. This has also been proved by, for instance, the country’s continuous refusal to allow the required IAEA safeguards, not to mention the increase in the intention of the DPRK to delay the inspections and develop nuclear bombs in secrecy. According to Kim, the issue of the DPRK nuclear crisis has undergone three phases. The first phase can be concluded as the period from signing the NPT to accepting the IAEA safeguards, the second includes IAEA inspection that led to suspension of withdrawal announcement, and the third phase which was characterized by high-level dialogues and which ended with the Geneva Agreed Framework.³³ The program called Simultaneous Development of Economy and Nuclear Weapons was established with the aim to “quantitatively and qualitatively enhance nuclear force so it can be of strategic and tactical

³² Kim, 2014, 1.

³³ Kim, 2014, 16.

use”.³⁴ For the nuclear sources to be constructed, several requirements need to be fulfilled and specific circumstances have to be ensured, namely “nuclear fuel procurement, a mid- and long-range delivery system, and strong command, communication, and information capabilities”.³⁵

The DPRK serves as the outstanding manifestation of the security dilemma, since it is assumed that the DPRK tries “to establish itself as a de facto nuclear power state after two decades of turbulence.”³⁶ If the DPRK’s nuclear capability today is compared to that of in the 1990s, the state is now significantly more developed. Allegedly, Kim Jong-un is not only capitalizing on the development of nuclear capability as a means of legitimizing his power status, but he also states that this project is the instruction of his predecessor, Kim Jong-il. There has been a nuclear weapons development crisis going on for the past twenty years and the international community could not come up with a plausible solution to deter the threat that the DPRK is imposing on the world.

The attitude of the DPRK regarding the nuclear talks and agreements has varied between cooperative and uncooperative. The DPRK’s “noncompliance was demonstrated in its refusal to participate in the talks, while its temporary cooperation was demonstrated in the form of its partial implementation of the agreements, concluding the agreements, freezing its nuclear weapons program and conducting nuclear tests.”³⁷

3. International aspects

Looking through the sanctions that became more severe after each violation, one might wonder how can the DPRK still survive, operate as a state and what resources can it use to provide minimum living standards for its population. Due to the unreliability of official records, if any, presented by the state, the trade volume, sources of income and the general economic situation of the country can mostly be estimated by outsiders. According to Grzelczyk, nowadays the DPRK still survives “by cultivating economic and political relationships with a number of countries, individuals, organizations, and companies,”³⁸ as well as maintaining relationships with other rogue states, underdeveloped and developing nations in the way of engaging in various forms of interdependence.

³⁴ Optcit, 1.

³⁵ Optcit, 2.

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ Kim, 2014, 5.

³⁸ Grzelczyk, 2018, 4.

The need for an international framework with the main mission of controlling atomic energy has emerged, and within that several efforts have been taken. For instance, the United States and Great Britain have concluded the Three Nation Agreed Declaration, agreeing that as wartime partners they would “share with all nations the scientific information associated with atomic energy for peaceful or civilian purposes.”³⁹ The holders of key details needed to be assured that there would be an appropriate system of safeguards for the sharing of information. Following that, the United Nations was called upon as a responsible body for establishing a commission that would come up with initiatives for a system of international control. With the United Nations entering the picture, more steps have been taken towards the establishment of the necessary institutions and a series of agreements regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The following section will be dedicated to the international relations aspect of the paper, describing the diplomatic difficulties that emerged due to the DPRK’s nuclear activities on the international and regional levels. Scrutinizing the evolution of international relations between the DPRK and the United States, ROK, Japan, China and Russia points to another segment that changed due to nuclear threats and it presents how specific countries made an attempt to maintain peaceful diplomatic relations despite the hostile attitude of the DPRK.

3.1. Clash between the DPRK and the international community

At the beginning of 1990s, it seemed that the DPRK would support its proposal of eliminating the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula, however, this attitude has gradually changed and after agreeing to take a step further towards denuclearization, the state began conducting nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 and has been acting in a way that assumes the DPRK’s goal, i.e. gradually increasing its nuclear capability. One aspect that is confusing for the outside world is the rhetoric that the DPRK projects, stating that their “actions were driven by U.S. hostility and [the DPRK]’s mistrust of the US”⁴⁰. The DPRK has been consciously and effectively isolating itself from the rest of the world since Kim Il-sung took control over the country. The diplomatic relations regarding the DPRK and the United States have been closely observed due to the general belief that the Americans would be able to make the rogue state give up its ambitions to be a nuclear threat and as the representatives of prosperity they would show the way to become a stable and booming member of the international

³⁹ Siracusa, 2008, 28.

⁴⁰ Kim, 2014, 5.

community. The most recent and most important milestones in the series of encounters between the United States and the DPRK will be discussed in the following section.

3.1.1. Relations with the United States

The nuclear conflict with the DPRK has been considered to have a central role in American foreign policy for the last previous decades, due to the different attitudes from American presidents as well as the changing circumstances in the DPRK (leader change, famine, mass emigration, nuclear development, etc.).

The roots of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the United States go back to the foundation of the state after the Korean War. From the DPRK's perspective, the United States has been the straight representation of the kind of 'enemy' that would intervene and occupy the state; hence the people are in great need of protection that the leadership and state ideology is willing to provide. During the bipolarism of the 20th century, the Korean peninsula has become a geographically significant spot in the East-Asian territory and for the United States it even became more important when the majority of the surrounding countries started to fall under Soviet influence, thus strengthening the communist ideology in the area and widening the Eastern bloc. After the Korean War, the main superpowers of the bipolar world took the share from the peninsula, with the Soviets influencing the DPRK and the United States enabling westernization in South Korea. Starting from the 1980s, the diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the United States could be described as one filled with roller coaster-like negotiations and policies. The United States, wishing to fulfil its role as an all-time Western superpower, expected the DPRK to react to the American demands concerning international aspects of the state. However, it appeared that the average attitude would not be working with the DPRK and when the United States applied a rather aggressive foreign policy towards the DPRK following the state's withdrawal from the NPT, the DPRK did not back down but went on with developing its nuclear technology.

In the eyes of the American presidential administration, the DPRK was no more than one of the "several Communist satellites" that remained standing even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was obvious, however, that the disintegration of the Soviet power did not eliminate the state ideology or the government structure of the DPRK and that state remained closed towards technological advancements that the Western countries had to offer, given that the DPRK was willing to join the community of the states and take up the obligations with the membership. Prior to the turn of the century, tensions on both international and regional levels have escalated to a point where getting into a potential nuclear war with the DPRK seemed rather probable. The rogue state was approached from several directions in order to ease the

tension and besides avoiding the outburst of a war, try to take steps towards denuclearization. There have been several rounds of agreements and negotiations conducted between the DPRK and the U.S., however, the continuous resistance and negligence from the DPRK's side to comply with the provisions of the bilateral agreements and the changing attitude of the American presidents towards the DPRK did not encourage the stabilization of international relations.

Following Clinton's presidency, during which the rather unsuccessful Agreed Framework and lenient attitude towards the DPRK was deemed to be ineffective in pulling through the American will to make the DPRK give up its nuclear program and begin denuclearization, the political atmosphere drastically changed. Tragic events, for instance the terrorist attack of 9/11, and the political message coming from the DPRK during the previous decades regarding its intentions and neglect of obligations have resulted in the Bush administration referring to the state as "axis of evil"⁴¹, a 'rogue state', as well as 'an outpost of tyranny' and the state has been declared as a clear and present danger to world peace. It was evident that the Bush administration did not wish to follow the steps of the Clinton administration and instead of conducting as many rounds of negotiations as deemed necessary, the presidency between 2001 and 2009 decided to follow a confrontational foreign policy towards the DPRK. Another change in foreign policy came around with the elections of Barack Obama who chose the silence policy method and lifted the terrorist state stigma as well with the firm belief that the regime would collapse from the inside. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the fact the DPRK-conducted nuclear tests have become more frequent during the Obama presidency, the reaction of the American leadership was rather calm and represented a policy of preferring negotiations and supporting the implementation of sanctions to hardline politics which could easily lead to the escalation of events resulting in an unwanted war.

Almost immediately after taking office in 2016, President Donald J. Trump was to face the issue of the DPRK and the continuous nuclear threat that the state posed to the world. When it was reported in August 2017 that the DPRK has successfully developed warheads for missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, Trump reinstated the label on the DPRK and reacted in an interview that America would wage a "war of fire and fury, and frankly, [with a] power, the likes of which the world has never seen"⁴² if the DPRK failed to cease nuclear

⁴¹George Bush State of the Union Address <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (Accessed: 28 April 2020)

⁴² Tamkin, 2017.

testing. The DPRK's response was a series of threats against the U.S. territory of Guam and American allies, such as Japan and South Korea. During the following months, the tension increased between the two powers and Trump also mentioned that the United States would enlarge its nuclear arsenal which could lead to unimaginable destruction in case of an actual war⁴³. Fortunately, and to the world's greatest surprise, by today it seems that the two leaders have found a common path. Unexceptionally, June 12, 2018 marks the date of the first and historic DPRK - United States Summit which was held in Singapore, where Trump and Kim have met and drawn up a joint statement. The statement includes four important points, referring to the establishment of a new relationship between the nations based on prosperity and peace; creating and maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula; the DPRK's responsibility for and commitment towards total denuclearization; and that both countries would recover remains of prisoners of wars back to their homeland⁴⁴. Trump seems to have changed his strategy and instead of provoking Kim Jong-un, he believes that they have a lot in common and that he can reach out to the Hermit Kingdom and make it give up its nuclear arsenal as well as its secret developments and sites. Even though after the summit, the U.S. committed to suspend military exercises in South Korea, no tangible steps regarding denuclearization or sanctions relief have been reached, mainly because both sides had contrasting interpretations of the concept of denuclearization and their commitments, and especially, they had diverse expectations towards the other party. Another significant agreement between the two states was expected to be reached during the second U.S-DPRK Summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam 27-28 February 2019. Despite the great expectations on both sides, the summit ended early and without an applicable nuclear deal since the leaders had seemingly incompatible demands towards one another, i.e. the DPRK was willing to give up a certain part of its nuclear arsenal, however, Trump was not willing to lift the sanctions for that little in exchange.⁴⁵

For the past couple of decades the demands that the two states upheld towards one another have not been altered, the core of the script is the same; the DPRK promising to give up its nuclear program, halt its development and putting verbal commitments on peaceful and total denuclearization on the table in exchange for lifting the sanctions that are becoming

⁴³ Griffiths, 2017.

⁴⁴ *Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit* (White House)

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/> (Accessed:28 April 2020)

⁴⁵ Oprysko, 2019.

tougher every year. On the contrary, the American side is willing to take steps in reducing the sanctions and is seemingly patient about the DPRK's decision, but the superpower is not going to give in for less than full compliance with previous agreements.

One thing is for sure, both sides appear to be optimistic about the future but even after several rounds of talks the leaders still do not seem to be on the same page regarding that future. The facts that a summit could be organized, and the states could begin talks again already show great progress, however, from a nuclear point of view it is questionable which approach towards denuclearization would be more flourishing and result in a breakthrough.

3.2. Regional aspect

Due to its geographical location, the DPRK has a rather determining and geopolitically important role in the Northeast Asian region. When Kim Jong-un declared the current strategy of the country in 2016, he did so in order to reaffirm the DPRK's commitment towards “simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity as long as the imperialists persist in their nuclear threat and arbitrary practice.”⁴⁶ This announcement is a reassuring confirmation that defines how the DPRK sees itself on the regional and global stage. Grzelczyk, in her book titled *North Korea's New Diplomacy*, introduces a sequence of four phases on how the security policy of the DPRK has developed over time and how it has affected its status in the region. The four phases lead up to the current position of the country; first had to fight for political recognition and sovereignty when it became a part of the Soviet bloc (first phase), then focused on becoming more independent and began to get ideologically further from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and emphasized the establishment of “security relationships” with similarly smaller states. The third phase contributing to the last phase, indulges taking advantage of the weapons that the state acquired from allies so that the DPRK could “provide and license weapons” which would eventually lead to the DPRK developing its own nuclear capacity and becoming a potential, yet not legally recognized nuclear-weapons state.⁴⁷

The international relations between the DPRK and other countries in the Northeast Asian region, namely the Republic of Korea (ROK), the PRC, the Russian Federation and Japan will be discussed in the following sections, paying attention to the changes in these relations as a result of the DPRK's military-first and nuclear-development-first policy. As for

⁴⁶ Grzelczyk, 2018, 105.

⁴⁷ Optcit, 109-110.

the ROK and Japan, the possibility occurs whether they should consider going nuclear since the nuclear threat coming from the DPRK is getting more terrifying and more frequent and it will soon arrive to a point where the reassurance from the United States and its nuclear umbrella would provide the necessary sense of protection and security. Regarding the PRC and Russia, the states have a stronger tie with the DPRK due to ideologies and alliance that the greater powers transferred to the DPRK.



Table 2: Map of the DPRK⁴⁸

3.2.1. Relationship with ROK

After the Korean War, both countries were quite occupied with restoring and re-stabilizing the country for the first time as independent states. Boosting the economy and enhancing development were major objectives of the government and later on turning towards each other also became an issue after decades filled with tension and ideological differences. On the one hand, traces of instability, distrust and high tensions characterized the relations

⁴⁸ Ford, 2018, xii.

between South Korea and the DPRK. On the other hand, during the presidency of South Korean General Roh Tae-woo between 1988 and 1993, the relations between North and South started to improve, “as new negotiations between the prime ministers of the DPRK and ROK began, raising hopes for reunification progress after only brief and intermittent talks and negotiations over the past decades⁴⁹. In 1998, the first opposition candidate, Kim Dae-jung was elected as president and his time in office has become known for accumulated economic and political contact with the northern neighbor which also contributed to an increased extent of communication and trade between the two parties. The South Korean president and Kim Jong-il, there hereditary successor of the DPRK leadership after the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, arranged a meeting in Pyongyang in 2000 (first Inter-Korean Summit after the announcement of the Sunshine Policy⁵⁰ in 1998), marking the very first meeting of the two countries’ leaders since 1945 and making Kim Dae-jung the first president to visit the DPRK after the division. The meeting was concluded with a positive outcome, as “[d]iscussions on reconciliation and economic cooperation”⁵¹ were mentioned and the event was seen as the first act towards a potential reunification.⁵²

When it was discovered that the DPRK is capable and, more importantly, willing to, develop and test nuclear weapons, diplomatic relations and talks froze again. In 2010, the previously successful Sunshine Policy was abandoned by the following President Lee Myung-bak due to an accident in the Yellow Sea which was later assumed to have been caused by a DPRK torpedo (although, the state rejected those claims to be valid). The following months carried back and forth provocation between the two countries and tensions reached a peak point in 2013 when the DPRK launched a scientific and technological satellite. During the years, the DPRK was conducting talks with South Korea, while making continuous progress with its missile testing and with carrying out nuclear tests. After conducting the nuclear tests, the United Nations General Assembly agreed on posing sanctions on the DPRK with an intention of discouraging the state from further tests and progress in the development.

At the same time, the third nuclear test has caused debates to rise among South Koreans regarding the ownership of their own nuclear capability and whether the country

⁴⁹ Wilson, 2002.

⁵⁰ The Sunshine Policy, announced by former President Kim Dae-Jung, was the foreign policy of South Korea towards the DPRK with the intention of softening the northern attitude towards South Korea. It also included goals to narrow the economic gap and restore the lost connection between the states.

⁵¹ Wilson, 2002.

⁵² Prior to the meeting in Pyongyang, the countries have contributed to an accord in 1991, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation. The agreement supposedly included non-aggressive actions, cultural and economic exchanges and on the establishment of a military hotline and commitment towards a peace regime.

should also ‘go nuclear’. As Ahn and Cho writes, this issue has created a partition among the South Korean population with the supporting group arguing that it is inevitable for the country to develop its own nuclear capability to defend itself from the Northern threat, it would increase the leverage of South Korea as opposed to the DPRK and it would also heighten national prestige within the international community. Regarding this argumentation, it is believed that the DPRK is likely “to make provocations and thus assume the hegemony in North-South relations”⁵³ if South Korea does not build its own nuclear capacity. Advocates from high positions⁵⁴ supports the nuclearization of South Korea by arguing that “[n]uclear deterrence can be the only answer”⁵⁵ so South Korea can feel peaceful and less vulnerable in the neighborhood of the DPRK. Others, like Hwang Woo-yea, the current chairman of the Saenuri Party, argue that if the country does not want to fall for the threats coming from the North, it “must establish a response system against nuclear weapons in order to re-establish the military balance of power.”⁵⁶ Moreover, the nuclear armory would not only serve as a defense, but it would also increase the power status of South Korea regionally and internationally as well, because it would allow the country to rise on the power ladder by bringing “nuclear warheads to the negotiating table [and it would] heighten the country’s national prestige and reinforce its sovereignty.”⁵⁷ Additionally, the supporters of the South Korean nuclear capability have an increased concern regarding “the effectiveness of the American nuclear umbrella”⁵⁸ because the attitude of the American presidency under Barack Obama was siding with the idea of bringing a world without any nuclear weapons, thus increasing the weaknesses of the U.S. nuclear umbrella which stands as a boosting factor for the idea to establish the South Korean nuclear armament.

On the contrary, a more progressive group of South Koreans strongly believe that the development of a South Korean nuclear capacity could lead to a devastating nuclear war between the two Koreas and the South Korean nuclearization would create a counter-pressure on the DPRK and would urge the rogue state to increase its nuclear capacity and produce even more nuclear warheads. Moreover, as opposed to the idea of increasing power status in the region, this group sees the beginning of “a fierce arms race in Northeast Asia”⁵⁹, involving Japan and Taiwan who would also feel the urge to equip with the necessary nuclear weapons

⁵³ Ahn and Cho, 2014, 28.

⁵⁴ For instance, Chung Mong-jun, the former chairman of the ruling Saenuri Party.

⁵⁵ Ahn and Cho, 2014, 27.

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ Ahn and Cho, 2014, 28.

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ Ahn and Cho, 2014, 26.

to keep up with the other countries in the region. They support the idea of South Korea remaining nuclear-free because it maintains stability in the Asian region and close diplomatic relations with the United States, which would be easily destroyed once South Korea decides to go nuclear.

The tension has increased in 2016, when the ROK decided to allow the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in the country.⁶⁰ This act rather undermined the progress towards denuclearization, shed light on core issues as well, “namely, the maneuvering among neighboring great powers and the test of wills between the two Koreas,”⁶¹ and added further factors to the equation around the ROK dilemma to remain nuclear-free. Furthermore, the deployment contributed to destabilizing the fragile relations in the Northeast Asian region as it undermined the Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrence and expanded the cooperation between the ROK, the United States and Japan. The year 2017 brought a new president, Moon Jae-in and new promises, to return to the Sunshine Policy and to restore peaceful times. Seemingly, both the Winter Olympics and the reopening of the hotline were attempts towards a new phase in the reconciliation. In April 2018, Kim Jong-un met with the South Korean President for the Third Inter-Korean Summit, marking the first time since the Korean War that a DPRK leader stepped on South Korean territory. The summit ended with a joint declaration towards the final goal, i.e. total denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. After several decades of negotiations, filled with tensions over nuclear tests and withdrawals from agreements, by 2018 both countries have reached a diplomatic breakthrough and established closer cooperation. The parties signed the Panmunjeom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula in April 2018. In the meantime, the DPRK and the United States also agreed to meet and discuss issues related to denuclearization, however, the summits resulted in no specific outcomes.

Consequently, since the partition of the two countries and the emerging nuclear threat from the DPRK reaching a peaceful unification has been among the top priorities for the two Koreas. Even though attempts have been made on both sides, so far, the outcomes of policies or agreements failed to meet the desired expectations.

⁶⁰ Although this foreign policy decision by former President Park Geun-hye has been highly criticized and it is believed that, among many other things, she agreed on the deployment and refused to engage in talks with the DPRK in order to ease the pressure and divert public attention from her wrongdoings. (Yu, 2017,72) Moreover, the deployment strengthened the DPRK’s fear over being absorbed by the South, consequently the state doubled the speed in developing its nuclear arsenal. (Yu, 2017, 75)

⁶¹ Yu, 2017, 63.

3.2.2. The Japan-DPRK relations

The relations between the states go back to the collapse of the USSR after which the DPRK was in need of money which provided motive for rapprochement. During that time, Japan had already been paying reparations for the ROK because of the period of occupation and colonization as a way of reconciliation. It seemed that the stage was set for the normalization of relations, however, talks were terminated several times due to threatening acts from the DPRK, for instance a (failed) satellite launch over Japan and catching a DPRK spy ship on Japanese territory. Nevertheless, in 2002 the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration was signed and in it the “leaders confirmed the shared recognition that establishing a fruitful political, economic and cultural relationship,”⁶² and the DPRK promised to further maintain the moratorium on missile launching for the future. The fundamental policy of Japan towards the DPRK is the normalization of relations keeping in mind the abovementioned declaration, although the resolution of this issue is hindered by concerning cases like “abductions, nuclear and missile issues as well as settlement of the unfortunate past.”⁶³ Abduction issues go back to the 1970s and 1980s, however the DPRK only admitted the wrongdoings in 2002 and failed to explain details on all of the abductees. From an international law point of view, the abductions are concerned to be severe violations of Japan’s sovereignty and violate the safety of Japanese citizens as well.

When the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, Japan reacted by banning all imports from the state and for the next period stalled the bilateral negotiations and talks. The heightened nuclear activity in the neighborhood of Japan reinsured the country to halt talks and after another nuclear test in 2009, the country banned exports to the DPRK.⁶⁴ The unfruitful negotiations and the empty promises from the DPRK increased the antipathy on the Japanese side and it appears that the relations will only be stabilized once the DPRK performs its commitments and fulfils denuclearization, putting an end to threatening its neighboring countries.

3.2.3 International relations with China

The common socialist alliance was preceded by assistance during the Korean War and that served as the foundation of a long-lasting relationship between the two states contributing to the PRC being undoubtedly the most significant trading partner of the DPRK.

⁶² *Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (Pyongyang, 2002)*

⁶³ *Japan-North Korea Relations – Overview* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html (Accessed: 28 April 2020)

⁶⁴ Ford, 2018, pp. 223-224.

Similarly, to others in the region, the relatively normalized relations were badly affected by the 2006 nuclear weapons test and the PRC advocated the adoption of Resolution 1718 imposing sanctions of the DPRK. Even though the support of sanctions represented a ‘shift in tone’⁶⁵ and the country also expressed its disagreement with the violations of agreements, the intentions behind Chinese condemnation appeared laid-back and there was no guarantee that trade restrictions were implemented with the proper force. The PRC is one of the countries that advocate imposing sanctions, however, hinders the effectiveness of the sanctions regimes due to maintaining and even strengthening economic ties with the rogue state.

It is known that one of the top priorities for the PRC is to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula and supporting the DPRK is beneficial for ensuring “a buffer between [the PRC] and the democratic South.”⁶⁶ That is why the deployment of the THAAD system in the ROK has been criticized by the PRC as it was seen as a possibility to weaken the PRC’s regional influence and military capabilities. In hope of escaping an unwanted, yet potential burden on Chinese shoulders, the state has a strong political interest in sustaining the leadership of Kim Jong-un “in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx.”⁶⁷ The most probable route for North Korean refugees lead through Chinese territory first, before moving onwards to other parts of Asia and they pose a significant issue on migration.

Prior to 2017, the PRC’s main role was that of a mediator and facilitator of peaceful events around the negotiating table. The Chinese foreign policy towards the Peninsula “have become more active, clear and balanced”⁶⁸, and have taken more practical steps towards denuclearization after the fourth nuclear missile test conducted by the DPRK, and at the same time began the transition from armistice to peace. Doing so the PRC wished to serve the expectations of the international community and encourage denuclearization, and at the same time aimed to fulfil the DPRK necessities for peace negotiations to resolve the differences.

Considering the alliance between the states, an important aspect emerged concerning commitments. The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, signed 11 July 1961 expresses the mutual respect between the parties regarding “sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in [...] internal affairs, [...] mutual

⁶⁵ Albert, June 2019.

⁶⁶ Albert, June 2019.

⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁶⁸ Yu, 2017, 78.

assistance and support,”⁶⁹ including the obligation to step up and defend the other, should that fall under armed attack by another state. Taking into account the provoking and aggressive behavior of the DPRK, the Chinese leadership has made several attempts to back out of this clause, especially if the DPRK initiated the conflict mainly because the PRC wishes to avoid being dragged into an armed conflict.

As an attempt to secure influence and participation, the Kim-Xi meetings were organized during 2018 and 2019 during which commitments were made to denuclearization and the DPRK leader agreed to open up for negotiations with the United States. Despite the diplomatic efforts and the maintenance of economic ties, there is no guarantee that the nuclear activities of the DPRK will not turn from an indirect to a direct threat to its Northern ally.

3.2.4. Relationship between Russia and the DPRK

Historically, the predecessor of Russia played an outstandingly important part in the foundation of the DPRK and granted all the support necessary for Kim Il-sung to establish its regime and secure its authority. A connection was built between the states due to the communist history, which was broken after the dissolution of the USSR and “resulted in the withdrawal of substantial economic subsidies to”⁷⁰ the DPRK and leaving the country in a rather vulnerable state.

Similarly, to the other countries, Russia has engaged in negotiations with the DPRK with the intention to make progress on denuclearization. The Kim-Putin Summit was held in April 2019 and presumably Kim Jon-un “needed to replace the narrative of weakness after failing to make a widely expected deal with the United States.”⁷¹ As one of the permanent members of the UNSC, Russia has an important role in adopting and imposing the sanctions, although in practice the state did not really enforce the restrictions, moreover it also violated the resolutions when reexported coal and did not prevent forced labor of North Koreans, hence kept open the door for the DPRK to generate income from foreign currency.

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⁶⁹ *Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (11 July 1961)

⁷⁰ Snyder, April 2019.

⁷¹ *ibid*

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List of Abbreviations

ABMT	<i>Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</i>
ANWFZ	<i>African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
CANWFZ	<i>Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
CD	<i>Conference on Disarmament</i>
CTBT	<i>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</i>
CTBTO	<i>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</i>
DPRK	<i>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</i>
IAEA	<i>International Atomic Energy Agency</i>
ICBM	<i>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</i>
ICJ	<i>International Court of Justice</i>
IMF	<i>International Monetary Fund</i>
IMS	<i>International Monitoring System</i>
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</i>
NWFZ	<i>Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone</i>
NNWS	<i>Non-Nuclear Weapon State</i>
NPT	<i>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</i>
NWS	<i>Nuclear Weapon State</i>
KJNWFZ	<i>Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
LANWFZ	<i>Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
OAU	<i>Organization of African Unity</i>
OEWG	<i>Open-ended Working Group</i>
OPANAL	<i>Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean</i>
PTBT	<i>Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</i>

SALT	<i>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</i>
SEANWFZ	<i>Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
SPNWFZ	<i>South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</i>
SSOD	<i>Special Session on Disarmament</i>
THAAD	<i>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense</i>
TPNW	<i>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
UNAEC	<i>United Nations Atomic Energy Commission</i>
UNDC	<i>United Nations Disarmament Commission</i>
UNDP	<i>United Nations Development Program</i>
UNIDIR	<i>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</i>
UNGA	<i>United Nations General Assembly</i>
UNODA	<i>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</i>
UNSC	<i>United Nations Security Council</i>
USSR	<i>United Soviet Socialist Republics</i>
KEDO	<i>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</i>
LWR	<i>Light-water Reactor</i>
PRC	<i>People's Republic of China</i>
ROK	<i>Republic of Korea</i>
WMD	<i>Weapons of Mass Destruction</i>